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 1 
MANAGING FEAR-BASED DEROGATION IN MURDER 
TRIALS 
John Rafael Perez† 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (“Rule 403”) governs all evidentiary decisions, 
and yet its foundational nature often leaves it unsatisfactorily questioned and criti-
cized. Rule 403 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prej-
udice.”1 This relatively simple statement speaks volumes about the deeply held 
values of the American adversarial system. Indeed, the need for undue prejudice to 
substantially outweigh probative value reveals a preference for admitting evidence 
even if that evidence may pose an unfair threat to a criminal defendant. This tendency 
is defensible because over-exclusion of evidence could certainly prevent parties from 
telling their full stories in court. For our system to deliver justice, however, we must 
properly decide when the threat of prejudice is too great such that admissibility must 
yield to greater values and ideals. 
According to Yale Law School Professor Stephen Carter, the idea of unfair prej-
udice is incredibly unclear and understudied.2 Despite the concept’s proliferation in 
judicial opinions, briefs, and academic articles, very few lawyers and scholars have 
sought to comprehensively define the term and clearly delineate its boundaries. For 
this reason, it is incredibly important to turn to the field of psychology, which closely 
studies human attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions under controlled conditions, for 
insights into the nature of “prejudice.”3 Indeed, psychological studies have informed 
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 1.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 2.  Stephen L. Carter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Evidence Class on 
Rule 403 (Jan. 2015). Indeed, this deficiency taps into a broader problem—that legal systems are seldom struc-
tured to account for predictable human frailties, even when there are dire consequences to allowing such frailties 
to contaminate legal decision-making. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: 
The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 138 (1990) (“The Supreme Court, however, has not 
welcomed empirical research on jury behavior when deciding evidence and trial procedure cases. Instead, the 
Justices seem to react to it with distrust and suspicion. They continue to approve legal rules based on intuitive 
assumptions about human behavior that research by psychologists has shown to be erroneous.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Epilogue for Psychology and the Law, in LAW, JUSTICE, 
AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 364 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Lev-
ine eds., 1977). 
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our understanding of human behavior for decades but have surprisingly been ex-
cluded from mainstream legal discourse.4 
This Article focuses on an important subset of psychological research to answer 
a controversial question: To what extent should we admit gruesome visual evidence, 
such as photographs of corpses, in murder trials? There is good reason to focus on 
this question. In murder trials, the very life and liberty of the defendants standing trial 
are at stake. Wrongful convictions born out of impermissible influences on juror de-
cision-making deprive defendants of these constitutional guarantees while also erod-
ing the legitimacy of the American justice system. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I discuss the prevailing Rule 403 
approach to considering gruesome visual evidence in both federal and state courts. 
Because the American judicial system heavily favors admitting evidence over ex-
cluding it for prejudice, gruesome visual evidence has become, for the most part, a 
mainstay in murder trials. Part II critically analyzes narrative integrity, the only viable 
rationale for the probative value of gruesome visual evidence in murder trials. By 
picking apart the Supreme Court’s arguments in Old Chief v. United States, I illus-
trate that this rationale is unpersuasive. Furthermore, I argue that gruesome visual 
evidence’s probative value, at least in the context of murder trials, is relatively low. 
In Part III, I discuss how the countervailing prejudice to the defendant caused by 
gruesome visual evidence far outweighs the evidence’s nominal probative value. By 
focusing on the robust psychological literature on Terror Management Theory, I ar-
gue that the effects of gruesome visual evidence are the very definition of unfairly 
prejudicial. Part IV then outlines two potential solutions that can be accomplished 
either by the amendment of relevant evidentiary codes or judicial reinterpretation of 
admissibility standards: (1) categorical exclusions of gruesome visual evidence and 
(2) shifting to a presumption of prejudice in the Rule 403 balancing test. I justify 
these solutions’ viability with reference to both current practice in state and federal 
courts as well as more forward-looking normative arguments about desirable law and 
policy. Finally, Part V responds to a host of counterarguments to this proposal. In the 
course of addressing these counterarguments, I discuss the fallibility of human actors, 
the inadequacy of existing ad hoc solutions, the importance of rule modifications in 
instituting broad policy changes, and the extent to which this proposal can be harmo-
nized with the prosecutor’s role and the adversarial system more broadly. I conclude 
on a hopeful note—that our growing knowledge of human cognition situates us well 
to align our legal rules with our greater ideals. 
I. THE PROBATIVE PRESUMPTION AND ADVERSARIAL STORYTELLING 
The very language of Rule 403 expresses a preference for admissibility over ex-
clusion. Not only does the rule require that prejudice substantially outweigh proba-
tive value to justify exclusion, but it even makes it discretionary to exclude substan-
tially prejudicial evidence at all.5 Because all fifty states have adopted the language 
                                                          
 4.  See, e.g., Tanford, supra note 2, at 138. Furthermore, psychology is only growing in its importance, 
given its relevance to many of our most controversial and divisive contemporary legal and policy issues. See, 
e.g., Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304 
(2016). 
 5.  FED. R. EVID. 403 (explaining that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence,” arguably making the 
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence,6 it is no surprise that courts across jurisdictions 
share this same inclination, particularly when faced with requests to introduce grue-
some visual photographs into evidence. To name just one example out of hundreds,7 
in State v. Hollis,8 the Kansas Supreme Court determined that photographs of shoot-
ing victims and snapshots of naked corpses stabbed multiple times were admissible.9 
Despite the grisly nature of these photographs, the court articulated the principle that 
such photographs were “not inadmissible because they [were] shocking or gruesome 
[as long as] they [were] relevant to material matters at issue.”10 
A. Stretching Admissibility Too Far 
The most troubling aspect of the tendency to admit gruesome visual evidence is 
how far courts have gone in relaxing the standard, almost eliminating the practical 
force of Rule 403 altogether, at least for photographs of corpses. To name just one 
example, in In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit found no 
error in the admission of photographs of victims charred by fire in a plane crash.11 
                                                          
exclusion of substantially prejudicial evidence completely optional (emphasis added)). 
 6.  See MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c); ALA. R. EVID. 403; ALASKA R. EVID. 403; ARIZ. R. EVID. 403; ARK. 
R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352; COLO. R. EVID. 403; CONN. CODE EVID. § 4034-3; DEL. R. EVID. 403; 
FLA. STAT. § 90.403; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-403; HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-403; IDAHO R. EVID. 403; ILL. R. 
EVID. 403; IND. R. EVID. 403; IOWA R. EVID. 5.403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445; KY. R. EVID. 403; LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. art. 403; ME. R. EVID. 403; MD. R. EVID. 5-403; MASS. GUIDE EVID. art. IV, § 403; MICH. R. EVID. 
403; MINN. R. EVID. 403; MISS. R. EVID. 403; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 26-10-403; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403; 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035; N.H. R. EVID. 403; N.J. R. EVID. 403; N.M. R. ANN. § 11-403; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
8C-1-403; N.D. R. EVID. 403; OHIO R. EVID. 403; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2403; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.160; PA. R. 
EVID. 403; R.I. R. EVID. 403; S.C. R. EVID. 403; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-403; TENN. R. EVID. 403; TEX. 
R. EVID. 403; UTAH R. EVID. 403; VT. R. EVID. 403; VA. R. EVID. 2:403; WASH. R. EVID. 403; W. VA. R. EVID. 
403; WIS. STAT. § 904.03; WYO. R. EVID. 403; Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. 1996) 
(“We will follow the policy set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 . . . .”); People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 
728, 732 (N.Y. 1988) (“[R]elevant evidence . . . may still be excluded . . . if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side . . . .”); see also GUAM R. EVID. 403; 
FORT BELKNAP TRIBAL CODE tit. VI, § 4; Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Saimon, 3 N. Mar. 
I. 365, 375-376 (1992); UNIF. R. EVID. 403. 
 7.  See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1979); Lickliter v. Chandler, No. 
5:08-CV-313-JMH/REW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117024, at *51 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2011); People v. Degorski, 
998 N.E.2d 637, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); People v. Mills, 537 N.W.2d 909, 917-19 (Mich. 1995); Elliot v. 
Kesler, 799 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Fisher, No. 65562, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2601, at 
*3-*8 (June 16, 1994); Henderson v. State, No. 01-05-00499-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5644, at *10-*11 
(June 29, 2006); 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 979 (2014); 1 ART OF ADVOCACY - DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE 
§ 10.06(4)(b) (2014) (explaining that exclusion of evidence for its gruesome nature is “unlikely” because “the 
rule requiring the exclusion of a gruesome injury photograph, if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative 
value, is vague and conclusory”); 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 403.03 (2014) (compiling cases 
wherein the probative value of gruesome visual evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice); M.C. Drans-
field, Annotation, Admissibility of Photograph of Corpse in Prosecution for Homicide or Civil Action for Caus-
ing Death, 73 A.L.R.2d 769 (2014) (compiling cases from all federal and state courts wherein gruesome pho-
tographs were admitted into evidence); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Admissibility in Homicide Prosecution 
of Allegedly Gruesome or Inflammatory Visual Recording of Crime Scene, 37 A.L.R.5th 515 (2014) (compiling 
cases from all federal and state courts wherein gruesome visual recordings were admitted). For a general account 
of the evolution of gruesome visual evidence jurisprudence and the presumption of admissibility, see MARIANA 
VALVERDE, LAW AND ORDER: IMAGES, MEANINGS, MYTHS 153-62 (2006). 
 8.  731 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1987). 
 9.  Id. at 270. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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The Fifth Circuit explained that even when “the testimony of the witnesses describing 
the discovery and condition of the bodies was not contradicted, and therefore there 
was little need to introduce the photographs,” the “photographs were not so gruesome 
that their prejudicial potential absolutely required their exclusion.”12 Many state ap-
pellate courts have taken a similarly liberal approach on review.13 For example, ac-
cording to the Maryland Court of Appeals, “[a]lthough [gruesome visual photo-
graphs] may be more graphic than other available evidence, like autopsy reports, 
[courts] have seldom found an abuse of a trial judge’s discretion in admitting them 
in evidence.”14 
Putting aside the policy debate around the normative desirability of liberal ad-
missibility standards, there is the legal issue of whether courts are properly interpret-
ing Rule 403’s standard for probative evidence or confusing it with the similar but 
distinct Rule 401 relevance standard.15 At this point, it is important to distinguish the 
two. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as having “any tendency 
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” when 
“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”16 As is apparent from the gen-
eral language of the rule, the relevance threshold is very low. The determination of 
probative value, on the other hand, is more discerning. According to the United States 
Supreme Court, the analysis of probative value should look beyond the individual 
piece of evidence in question and examine all available substitutes.17 Relevant evi-
dence can still be excluded if its probative value, in light of the entire evidentiary 
record and all existing alternatives, is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
In determining what the probative value, as opposed to mere relevance, of grue-
some visual evidence is, it helps to examine case law from different jurisdictions. 
Courts have generally justified the probative value of gruesome visual evidence 
through a number of familiar rationales. In State v. Gerlaugh,18 for example, the Ar-
izona Supreme Court found no error in the admission of photographs of a murder 
victim’s body into evidence. The court explained that “[p]hotographs can be admitted 
to aid in identifying the victim, to illustrate how the crime was committed, to aid the 
jury in understanding testimony, and to show the location of mortal wounds.”19 In 
addition to these stated reasons, courts have also justified gruesome visual evidence 
as a way to refute an argument of self-defense20 or show the victim’s body position-
ing.21 
The issue with many of these rationales, however, is that they still seem to fall 
                                                          
 12.  Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). 
 13.  See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 540 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Md. 1988). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Indeed, judicial opinions arguably reveal a conflation of these two standards. See, e.g., State v. Hollis, 
731 P.2d 260, 270 (Kan. 1987). 
 16.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 17.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1997). 
 18.  654 P.2d 800 (Ariz. 1982). 
 19.  Id. at 805. 
 20.  See, e.g., People v. Becker, 2 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1942); Waters v. Commonwealth, 124 S.W.2d 97 
(Ky. 1939); Commonwealth v. Peronace, 195 A. 57 (Pa. 1937). 
 21.  See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 63 F.2d 147 (D.C. 1933); People v. Jersky, 36 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. 
1941); People v. Smith, 104 P.2d 510 (Cal. 1940); State v. Lantzer, 99 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1940); State v. Hamilton, 
102 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1937). 
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back on the relevance standard when they should be using the probative standard. 
Indeed, courts acknowledge that while gruesome visual evidence may be relevant to 
showing the location of a wound, for example, it is only one of numerous ways to 
establish this fact in the record. In Pennsylvania, to determine a gruesome photo-
graph’s probative value, the court must inquire into its “essential evidentiary 
value.”22 Similarly, in Georgia, admission of a post-autopsy photograph “requires 
that the photograph be . . . necessary to establish a material fact . . . that could only 
become apparent because of the autopsy.”23 Many other jurisdictions have articulated 
similar understandings of probative value that emphasize the idea of necessity rather 
than mere relevance.24 
Considering this emphasis on necessity, the aforementioned rationales for admit-
ting gruesome visual evidence simply do not carry the day. Indeed, more often than 
not, the stated purposes for introducing gruesome visual evidence can be fulfilled 
through other means such as witness or expert testimony. There is, however, an im-
portant purpose for gruesome visual evidence that cannot simply be substituted 
through other means: narrative integrity. The United States Supreme Court discussed 
this rationale, in depth, for the first time in the landmark case Old Chief v. United 
States.25 
B. Narrative Integrity and the Story of Old Chief 
In Old Chief, a defendant was accused of violating a statute that prohibited the 
possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction.26 He offered to 
stipulate to his prior conviction, and argued that his offer rendered evidence of the 
name and nature of his prior offense—assault causing serious bodily injury—inad-
missible because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.27 The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant,28 but not without first laying 
out the value of narrative integrity. Specifically, Justice Souter wrote that “the pros-
ecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, 
that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary 
                                                          
 22.  Commonwealth v. Liddick, 370 A.2d 729, 730 (Pa. 1977) (emphasis added). 
 23.  McCullough v. State, 341 S.E.2d 706, 706 (Ga. 1986) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 24.  See, e.g., State v. Harper, No. E2014-01077-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 885, at *50 
(Nov. 3, 2015) (“As a general rule, where medical testimony adequately describes the degree or extent of an 
injury, gruesome and graphic photographs should not be admitted. Photographic evidence may be excluded 
when it does not add anything to the testimonial description of the injuries. Autopsy photographs often fall into 
this category. . . . If the defendant offers to stipulate to the facts shown in the photograph or the defendant does 
not dispute the testimony that the photographs illustrate, the more likely the prejudicial effect will substantially 
outweigh the photographs’ probative value” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Berry v. State, 718 S.W.2d 447, 451-452 (Ark. 1986) (citing cases with similar reasoning); State v. Collins, 727 
S.E.2d 751, 758 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he extent to which an autopsy photograph corroborates other evi-
dence or testimony increases its probative value. However, the probative value from a photograph’s tendency 
to corroborate will vary depending on the facts of an individual case.”); discussion infra Part IV.B (analyzing, 
in depth, Utah’s well-developed jurisprudence on essential evidentiary value). 
 25.  519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 26.  Id. at 174. 
 27.  Id. at 175-76. 
 28.  Some courts have interpreted this ruling as applying only in “narrow circumstances.” See, e.g., Daniels 
v. United States, 738 A.2d 240, 252 (D.C. 1999). 
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force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.”29 
The Supreme Court laid out a dual purpose for the value of narrative integrity. 
First, the Court claimed that the “persuasive power of the concrete and particular is 
often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places 
on them.”30 Specifically, “making a case with testimony and tangible things not only 
satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive 
richness.”31 Second, and according to the Court, more importantly, “there lies the 
need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors’ expectations about what 
proper proof should be.”32 “If [jurors’] expectations are not satisfied, triers of fact 
may penalize the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against 
that party.”33 “If suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series 
differently, as by announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like say-
ing, ‘never mind what’s behind the door,’ and jurors may well wonder what they are 
being kept from knowing.”34 
The following two sections will work in tandem to address the viability of this 
theory of narrative integrity based on both prongs of the Rule 403 analysis. Part II 
will address the probative prong by critically analyzing the Supreme Court’s asser-
tions about concrete evidence and jury gap-filling capacities. In Part II, I hope to 
demonstrate that the probative value of gruesome visual evidence, examined through 
the very rationales laid out by the Supreme Court in Old Chief, is relatively low. Part 
III will then address the prejudicial prong by discussing contemporary psychological 
literature on the damaging cognitive impact of exposure to gruesome visual evidence. 
Through this discussion, I hope to illustrate, through an incredibly robust empirical 
literature, that the prejudicial effect of such evidence is far too great a burden to per-
mit. 
 
 The subsequent analysis is specific to the narrow situation wherein one side 
attempts to introduce gruesome visual evidence in murder trials when other alterna-
tives are readily available. I do not seek to attack narrative integrity wholesale, and I 
acknowledge that narrative integrity may remain a crucial aspect of our adversarial 
system in a number of cases. In the following sections, however, I argue that the value 
of narrative integrity is minimal in this particular evidentiary circumstance and is far 
outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant (and, perhaps, the threat 
to our justice system’s legitimacy). 
II. HOLES IN THE NARRATIVE AND REEVALUATING THE “PROBATIVE” 
A. Unfounded Fears of Jury Backlash 
It is unclear how the Court reached its conclusion that jurors “may penalize the 
                                                          
 29.  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87. 
 30.  Id. at 187. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 188. 
 33.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering 
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978)). 
 34.  Id. at 189. 
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party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against that party.”35 
Contemporary psychological literature on coherence-based reasoning has demon-
strated that human beings have impeccable cognitive gap-filling capacities.36 If the 
prosecutor omits a photograph of the victim’s corpse, but is able to construct a co-
herent narrative of guilt in all other respects, jurors should have no problem drawing 
inferences of that defendant’s guilt based on the entire evidentiary record.37 Psycho-
logical research suggests that this is a far more likely outcome than jurors “penaliz-
ing” one party. 
The well-documented confirmation bias phenomenon also casts doubt on the 
Court’s concerns. The gist of this human tendency is that even the smallest types of 
suggestions or persuasions as to a specific theory of a case may push individuals to 
search for, select, and interpret information in a manner that confirms rather than 
refutes the theory.38 Multiple studies have demonstrated this effect in the criminal 
justice setting.39 For example, Steve Charman and colleagues found that participants 
reported higher similarity between a suspect and a facial composite when they were 
simply told that the particular suspect was guilty.40 Additionally, Nick Lange, and 
colleagues found that participants who were verbally led to believe that a speaker was 
suspected of a crime perceived more incriminating statements in recordings of that 
speaker’s speech.41 
It is staggering how little it takes to influence jurors’ attitudes, behaviors, and 
cognitions. In a provocative set of studies at New York University, John Bargh illus-
trated how participants primed with words related to rudeness interrupted the exper-
imenter with more speed and frequency than those primed with words related to po-
liteness.42 In a second study, he demonstrated how participants primed with words 
related to old age actually walked more slowly down the hall.43 Finally, and fright-
eningly, he also demonstrated that participants primed with African-American faces 
exhibited more hostility towards an experimenter’s request.44 The experimenters 
found such effects despite the faces being subliminally flashed for only thirteen to 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 188. 
 36.  See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision-Making: The Story 
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model]; Nancy Penning-
ton & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
242 (1986). 
 37.  See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 36, at 523-29. 
 38.  See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979); Ray-
mond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 
175, 175 (1998) (reviewing evidence of the confirmation bias in a variety of contexts). 
 39.  For an extended discussion of this bias in the forensic investigation setting, see John Rafael Peña 
Perez, Comment, Confronting the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 457 (2015). 
 40.  Steve D. Charman et al., Exploring the Diagnostic Utility of Facial Composites: Beliefs of Guilt Can 
Bias Perceived Similarity Between Composite and Suspect, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 76, 76 
(2009). 
 41.  Nick D. Lange et al., Contextual Biases in the Interpretation of Auditory Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 178, 178 (2011). 
 42.  John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype 
Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 231, 234-36 (1996). 
 43.  Id. at 237-38. 
 44.  Id. at 239. 
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twenty-six milliseconds.45 If even unconscious primes can be tactically employed to 
influence jurors, it seems unlikely that excluding an arguably duplicative piece of 
evidence would substantially burden the party attempting to introduce it. Instead, if 
something is missing in the narrative or if pieces are presented out of order, jurors 
are likely to fill in the gaps based on the strength of the available evidence and the 
plausibility of each side’s constructed narratives. If that is not enough to convince 
detractors, studies even go as far as to suggest that more subtle types of suggestion, 
rather than overt attempts at persuasion, can actually be more effective in pushing a 
jury to decide issues in one’s favor.46 This finding flies in the face of the Court’s fear 
that disallowing gruesome visual evidence, an overt tool of persuasion, would put 
one party at a categorical disadvantage. 
One may argue that, because the prosecution has the higher burden of proof in 
criminal cases, they should not be deprived of a powerful tool of persuasion. In ad-
dressing this argument, it is worth considering that jurors bring their own expecta-
tions and preconceived notions with them into trials, and these schemas can be in-
credibly resistant to change in a way that benefits the prosecution.47 The manner in 
which the legal system is portrayed in popular media, in particular, may have an im-
pact on jurors’ susceptibility to persuasions of guilt. For example, there are countless 
movies and television series that feed into society’s expectations that the criminal 
justice system is always able to correctly determine the identity of an accused mur-
derer.48 Of course we know that, in reality, this type of closure is not always guaran-
teed, given the general obstacles to complete information in both the investigation 
and trial phases. Still, if jurors anticipate, based on their media-induced expectations, 
that the perpetrator of a murder will always be identified and punished, they may 
come in with a tendency to deliver verdicts that fit within the narrative of guilt to 
which they have become accustomed.49 In other words, a finding of “not guilty” be-
comes much less psychologically satisfying because it doesn’t comport with jurors’ 
ideas of how the justice system is supposed to function. The danger of this preference 
for guilty verdicts is only heighted by the psychological literature showing that 
“blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to 
express and defend social values and expectations.”50 Perhaps instead of framing the 
discourse as one that highlights a miniscule loss to the prosecutor, we should 
                                                          
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See, e.g., Jack W. Brehm & John Sensenig, Social Influence as a Function of Attempted and Implied 
Usurpation of Choice, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 703 (1966). 
 47.  Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 868-69 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Prototypes]; see also Vicki L. Smith, When 
Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicki 
L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People’s Prior Knowledge of 
Crime Categories, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517 (1996). 
 48.  See e.g., LEGALLY BLONDE (Type A Films 2001); Suits (Universal Cable Productions); The Good 
Wife (CBS Productions). Even when movies or television episodes do not depict the perpetrator being found 
guilty at trial, they often, at the very least, reveal the true identity of the perpetrator to the viewers, providing 
them with some sense of closure. See, e.g., How to Get Away with Murder (ABC Studios). 
 49.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Ac-
quaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 729 (2010) (“‘Cultural cognition’ refers to the tendency of 
individuals to conform their perceptions of legally consequential facts to their defining group commitments.”). 
 50.  Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 257 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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acknowledge how the prosecutor already starts out with a significant advantage51 be-
cause of juror schemas that favor closure, attribution, and blame. 
It is also worth noting how selectively we tend to place our mistrust of the jury’s 
innate abilities. To mistrust a jury with the task of making inferences despite gaps in 
their knowledge while trusting them to separate any emotions they experience as a 
result of exposure to gruesome visual evidence from the independent weight of the 
evidence seems inherently contradictory. We entrust juries to make decisions with 
incomplete information all the time, in almost every single trial. On the other hand, 
contemporary court practices such as judicial admonitions, voir dire, banning pro-
pensity evidence, and excluding hearsay all seem to point to an acknowledgement of 
the imperfection of human perception and cognition, and the unavoidable emotional 
effects some types of evidence may have on a lay juror. At the very least, we should 
turn to the psychological literature in making difficult policy decisions based on ju-
rors’ actual capabilities and vulnerabilities. 
B. Reconsidering the Value of Tangible Things 
The Court’s other rationale that “making a case with testimony and tangible 
things not only satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story 
with descriptive richness”52 is arguably inapplicable in the context of murder trials. 
First, with regards to the establishment of a crime’s formal definition, the crucial 
factor for murder is intent. Pictures of corpses do very little to satisfy the formal 
definition of the offense, which has to do with the mental state of the offender and 
not the status of the victim. Indeed, the fact that someone died in a murder trial is a 
given. Jurors don’t need, and are not likely to ask for, a photograph of the dead body 
to confirm that. In the few instances wherein the picture of the corpse may give in-
sights into the mental state of an offender, such as when wounds evince a deliberate 
use of force or premeditation, such information can easily be imparted to the jury in 
other ways, such as testimony, diagrams, charts, figures, or cropped or altered pho-
tographs. 
The argument about a colorful narrative with rich descriptions is well taken. In 
an adversarial system, each side must be able to present a persuasive story on behalf 
of their client. Still, we must be wary of defining our system by its willingness to 
promote adversarial storytelling rather than the extent to which it safeguards the val-
ues of due process. A prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the government is im-
portant, but it must be harmonized with every lawyer’s ethical duty to uphold the 
primary purposes of our system—fairness and justice. First, it is important to reiterate 
that most anything presented through a picture of a corpse can be presented through 
other means. No information even has to be lost by gruesome visual evidence’s ex-
                                                          
 51.  And this does not even touch on the significant resource disparities between prosecutors and defense 
lawyers. See, e.g., C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Convictions in the United States, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 64 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008) 
(“The adversarial system relies on the skill and resources of the prosecution and the defense, and nearly always 
in criminal cases, the prosecution enjoys considerably more resources than does the defense. These resource 
advantages include human resources (investigators, staff, etc.) and budgetary resources.”). 
 52.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997). 
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clusion, and so perhaps the concerns about descriptive richness are overblown. Sec-
ond, when the value of a colorful narrative is stacked up against the value of our 
system’s integrity, it will be difficult to find a lawyer who values the former over the 
latter. The following section of this Article engages in this complex value-based anal-
ysis by discussing, in-depth, why our system’s integrity is endangered by the admis-
sion of gruesome visual evidence and, consequently, why a relatively minor con-
straint on descriptive richness is entirely justified. Moreover, Part V will respond to 
counterarguments about whether limiting the extent to which we admit gruesome 
visual evidence endangers either the prosecutor’s role or the adversarial system more 
generally. 
III. STARING DEATH IN THE FACE AND EXPOSING UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
Psychologists Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon first in-
troduced Terror Management Theory in 1986.53 The theory is premised on the human 
capacity for self-reflective thought, which creates a unique awareness of the inevita-
bility of death.54 Reminders of human mortality, especially the presentation of grue-
some visual evidence in court, may leave people “paralyzed with terror.”55 In fact, 
hundreds of studies have utilized even less potent manipulations than gruesome pho-
tographs to elicit this psychological fear.56 The main way in which people cope with 
this existential anxiety is to cling to “cultural worldviews” that imbue one’s existence 
with “meaning, order, predictability, and permanence by means of stable cognitive 
frameworks or narratives.”57 Such worldviews include a broad range of cultural, his-
torical, religious, or political beliefs about how the world should function.58 These 
beliefs provide a “prescription for leading a good, meaningful life” as well as “some 
hope of [symbolic] immortality.59 In short, justifying these protective and comforting 
beliefs is how human beings manage their terror. 
A. Fear-Based Derogation of the “Other” 
The natural consequence of people’s reliance on cultural worldviews to buffer 
death-anxiety is the derogation of those who do not share these same views.60 This 
                                                          
 53.  Jeff Greenberg et al., The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management 
Theory, in PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF 189 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1986); see also THOMAS A. PYSZCZYN-
SKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR (2003). 
 54.  Greenberg et al., supra note 53, at 196. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See, e.g., Brian L. Burke et al., Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of 
Mortality Salience Research, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (2010). 
 57.  Mark J. Landau et al., A Function of Form: Terror Management and Structuring the Social World, 87 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 190, 192 (2004); see also Jeff Greenberg et al., Proximal and Distal Defenses 
in Response to Reminders of One’s Mortality: Evidence of a Temporal Sequence, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 91, 91-93 (2000) (“[D]eath-related thought . . . triggers symbolic cultural worldview de-
fense.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence of a Terror Management Function of Cultural Icons: The 
Effects of Mortality Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished Cultural Symbols, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1211 (1995). 
 59.  Greenberg et al., supra note 54, at 196. 
 60.  See id. at 199-200 (“We suggest that the pervasive tendency of in-group members to display negative 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors toward outgroup members is an attempt to defuse the threat to one’s own beliefs 
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effect persists because dissenting individuals pose a threat to the stability, self-es-
teem, and symbolic immortality created by cultural worldviews.61 Studies have op-
erationalized this derogation in two ways: (1) participants’ attitudes towards individ-
uals who criticize their worldviews explicitly and (2) participants’ attitudes towards 
individuals who are merely from a different social group.62 
Studies show that mortality salience63 causes people to manifest increased neg-
ative attitudes towards those who directly criticize their worldviews. For example, 
one study showed that reminding American participants of their mortality resulted in 
negative reactions towards a hypothetical interviewee with an unfavorable view of 
the United States.64 Another study took terror management into the real world by 
analyzing actual romantic partners.65 The study found that mortality salience reduced 
feelings of commitment in couples that were asked to ponder the differences in their 
worldviews.66 
Furthermore, studies show that mortality salience causes people to manifest in-
creased negative attitudes towards those who merely belong to a different social, po-
litical, or religious group. In particular, studies have shown how, under mortality sa-
lience, Christians react more negatively to Jews as opposed to other Christians,67 
                                                          
implied by the existence of the outgroup.”). 
 61.  Derogation is not the only documented effect of terror management. Indeed, when reminded of their 
death, people are more likely to rely on heuristic cues in analyzing the persuasiveness of specific arguments 
rather than on deep, deliberate assessments of the merits of such arguments. See, e.g., Sheldon Solomon et al., 
The Effects of Mortality Salience on Personally-Relevant Persuasive Appeals, 23 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 
177, 177 (1995) (demonstrating that participants relied on expert status rather than argument strength when they 
were aware of their own mortality); see also Diane M. Mackie & Leila T. Worth, Processing of Persuasive In-
Group Messages, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 812, 812 (1990) (demonstrating a similar effect for 
ingroup status). One explanatory theory for this effect is that coping with thoughts of death produces “self-
regulatory fatigue.” Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Regulatory Processes Defend Against the Threat of Death: 
Effects of Self-Control on Thoughts and Fear of Dying, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49, 59 (2006). 
In other words, because participants use so much of their cognitive resources defending against death thoughts, 
they have minimal resources left over to engage in deliberate processing and overcoming cognitive heuristics, 
stereotypes, and shortcuts. Id. It is easy to see how this effect works hand in hand with the derogation of others. 
It is extremely difficult to critically assess one’s stereotypes and biases against those who challenge one’s 
worldviews when one’s cognitive processes have already been depleted. In this way, the heuristic processing 
effect and the derogation effect are inextricably linked. 
 62.  Ya Hui Michelle See & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluation of Ingroup and 
Outgroup Sources: The Impact of Pro- Versus Counterattitudinal Positions, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 405, 406 (2006); see also Bernice L. Z. Khoo & Ya Hui Michelle, Mortality Salience and Evaluations 
of In-Group Versus Out-Group Critics: The Role of Criticism Legitimacy and Perceived Threat, 44 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 242 (2014). 
 63.  “Mortality salience” refers to an induced state wherein participants are made aware of their mortality 
and the fact that they will someday die. This differs from terror management, which pertains to the subsequent 
subconscious processes that participants use to cope with the resulting anxiety. 
 64.  Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience 
on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
308, 315-17 (1990). 
 65.  Amy Strachman & Jeff Schimel, Terror Management and Close Relationships: Evidence that Mor-
tality Salience Reduces Commitment Among Partners With Different Worldviews, 23 J. SOC. & PERS. RELA-
TIONSHIPS 965 (2006). 
 66.  Id. at 973. 
 67.  Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 309-13. 
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Italians react more negatively to Germans as opposed to other Italians,68 and Ameri-
cans donate less to international as opposed to domestic charities.69 Participants in 
these studies exhibited negative attitudes and behaviors towards an outgroup member 
even without actual evidence that the outgroup member actually disagreed with the 
participants’ worldviews. In short, the “mere existence of others” served to threaten 
participants’ faith in their cultural worldviews.70 
The terror management is one of a limited number of phenomena that have been 
directly studied in the courtroom setting. Studies have shown that reminders of mor-
tality that arise during the course of a trial can have a demonstrable impact on the 
attitudes, behaviors, and most importantly, verdicts of legal decision-makers. Aaron 
Rosenblatt’s seminal study of judicial decision-making is illustrative.71 In the study, 
judges had to decide on an appropriate bond in the hypothetical case of an arrested 
prostitute.72 Judges who wrote out their thoughts on their own death prior to the bond 
assessment set a more punitive average bond of $455.73 Judges in the control condi-
tion, on the other hand, set an average bond of only $50.74 Rosenblatt also managed 
to replicate this effect with ordinary individuals instead of judges,75 generalizing the 
findings to jury decision-making as well. Rosenblatt determined that this punitive 
effect76 was a likely result of the prostitute’s violation of participants’ worldviews 
concerning conventional morality.77 
Another study by Lori Nelson investigated how terror management affects the 
                                                          
 68.  Emanuele Castano et al., I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and 
Ingroup Bias, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 135 (2002). 
 69.  Eva Jonas et al., The Scrooge Effect: Evidence that Mortality Salience Increases Prosocial Attitudes 
and Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1342 (2002). 
 70.  Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 310. 
 71.  Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality Salience 
on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681 
(1989). 
 72.  Id. at 682. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 683-84. 
 76.  Psychologists have also discovered a leniency effect following terror management in a narrow set of 
circumstances. Specifically, Joel Lieberman flipped Aaron Rosenblatt’s seminal paradigm by placing the em-
phasis on the victim of the crime rather than the perpetrator. Joel D. Lieberman et al., Vicarious Annihilation: 
The Effect of Mortality Salience on Perceptions of Hate Crimes, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 547 (2001). Specifi-
cally, Lieberman analyzed hate crimes by varying the distinctiveness of the victim. Id. at 556-57. When a hate 
crime was described in abstract terms with no specific victim mentioned, participants were more punitive to-
wards perpetrators of hate crimes. Id. at 561. Conversely, when the victim was described as gay, threatening 
specific participants’ worldviews, participants were actually more lenient in their treatment of the perpetrators. 
Id. at 556-57, 559, 561. This Note acknowledges the existence of the leniency effect but focuses primarily on 
the punitive effect for three important reasons. First, the punitive effect is more robust, prevalent, and well 
documented. See, e.g., supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 83. Second, in murder 
trials, the victim is no longer around, and so the likelihood that participants will anchor their decisions on the 
victim’s characteristics are reduced. Third, the punitive effect is arguably the most systemically problematic 
manifestation of terror management because of its potential to increase the rate of false convictions, sending 
innocent individuals to lifetimes in prison or even death. 
 77.  Rosenblatt et al., supra note 71, at 684-86. For further discussion of the punitive effects of mortality 
salience, see Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom: Exploring the Effects of Mortality Sali-
ence on Legal Decision Making, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 407, 413-22 (2005); and Donald P. Judges, 
Scared to Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror Management, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 155, 163, 
167-69 (1999). 
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apportionment of blame in adversarial situations.78 Nelson asked American partici-
pants to decide a hypothetical lawsuit between an injured driver and either an Amer-
ican or Japanese automobile manufacturing company.79 Participants that, prior to the 
assessment, were exposed to a gruesome video involving burned corpses, blood, cas-
kets, and graveyards, exhibited a nationalistic bias in their assessments of guilt.80 
Specifically, participants under mortality salience were much more likely to blame 
the driver rather than an American automobile company.81 This same bias was not 
present when the automobile company was Japanese.82 
For those who still have reservations about the robustness of the literature on 
Terror Management Theory, it is helpful to look not just at the hundreds of empirical 
terror management studies worldwide,83 but also at the theory’s theoretical overlap 
with core psychological phenomena that have explained inequality and inter-group 
conflict for decades. Examples include scapegoating,84 the outgroup homogeneity 
                                                          
 78.  Lori J. Nelson et al., General and Personal Mortality Salience and Nationalistic Bias, 23 PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 884 (1997). 
 79.  Id. at 886. 
 80.  Id. at 886-89. 
 81.  Id. at 887-89. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  For additional studies that support the general predictions of Terror Management Theory, see Jamie 
Arndt et al., Subliminal Exposure to Death-Related Stimuli Increases Defense of the Cultural Worldview, 8 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 379 (1997); Orit Taubman Ben-Ari et al., Does a Threat Appeal Moderate Reckless Driving? A 
Terror Management Theory Perspective, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 1 (2000); Burke et al., 
supra note 56; Alison Cook et al., Firing Back at the Backfire Effect: The Influence of Mortality Salience and 
Nullification Beliefs on Reactions to Inadmissible Evidence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 289 (2004); Michael K. 
Coolsen & Lori J. Nelson, Desiring and Avoiding Close Romantic Attachment in Response to Mortality Sali-
ence, 44 OMEGA: J. DEATH & DYING 257 (2002); Victor Florian & Shlomo Kravetz, Fear of Personal Death: 
Attribution, Structure, and Relation to Religious Belief, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 600 (1983); Ying-
Yi Hong et al., The History of War Strengthens Ethnic Identification, 2 J. PSYCHOL. CHINESE SOCIETIES 77 
(2001); Eva Jonas et al., Currencies as Cultural Symbols – An Existential Psychological Perspective on Reac-
tions of Germans Toward the Euro, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 129 (2004); Mark J. Landau, Deliver Us from Evil: 
The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush, 30 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1136 (2004); Ara Norenzayan & Ian G. Hansen, Belief in Supernatural Agents 
in the Face of Death, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 174 (2006); Tova Rosenbloom, Sensation 
Seeking and Risk Taking in Mortality Salience, 35 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1809 (2003); 
Kumagai Tomohiro & Ohbuchi Ken-Ichi, The Effect of Mortality Salience and Collaborative Experience on 
Aggression of “Third-Party Victims,” 62 TOHOKU PSYCHOLOGICA FOLIA 109 (2003); Kees van den Bos, Un-
certainty Management: The Influence of Uncertainty Salience on Reactions to Perceived Procedural Fairness, 
80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 931 (2001); and Kees van den Bos & Joost Miedema, Towards Under-
standing Why Fairness Matters: The Influence of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Procedural Fairness, 79 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 355 (2000). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., The Role of the Judge in the 
Twenty-First Century: Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1253-57 (2006) (failing to 
replicate previous terror management findings, but arguably because the mortality salience manipulation, hav-
ing participants hear about a gravedigger, was simply not a potent enough manipulation). 
 84.  See, e.g., Neel Burton, The Psychology of Scapegoating: Scapegoating Is as Ancient as It Is Deeply 
Rooted, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201312/the-
psychology-scapegoating; see also Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears, Minor Studies of Aggression: VI. 
Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCHOL.: INTERDISC. & APPLIED 301 (1940); Edwin 
Poppe, Effects of Changes in GNP and Perceived Group Characteristics on National and Ethnic Stereotypes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, 31 J. APPLIED. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1689 (2001). For an account of how scapegoating 
manifests itself more specifically in the terror management context, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Our Existential 
Death Penalty: Judges, Jurors, and Terror Management, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 64-75 (2008). (“If my 
belief system protects me from the dread of death, your belief system threatens my protection. In response, to 
save my protection, I must destroy yours.”). 
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effect,85 social distancing,86 and dehumanization.87 In short, it is no longer productive 
to doubt that these cognitive pitfalls do exist and exert a considerable impact on de-
cision-makers. Instead, we should make the acknowledgment of these human short-
comings a major factor in crafting important legal and policy decisions. 
B. The “Other” in the Courtroom 
Terror Management Theory is highly relevant to the Rule 403 analysis because 
it presents two potential routes for impermissible prejudice to infect the trial. First, 
jurors reminded of their death may act more punitively towards those from visible, 
discernible minority groups. Second, jurors reminded of their death may act more 
punitively towards a criminal defendant solely because the defendant has been ac-
cused of murder, a worldview-destabilizing criminal offense. I will discuss both 
routes in turn. 
There is a robust psychological literature on how the group membership and ide-
ologies of the accused can trigger increased punitive behavior in decision-makers 
under mortality salience. Jurors reminded of their death may treat the accused in an 
excessively punitive way based on factors such as race,88 religion,89 political views,90 
gender,91 sexuality,92 national origin,93 or explicitly expressed opinions on deeply 
held beliefs.94 Furthermore, psychologists have found that derogation processes are 
most potent and robust when there has been a time lag between the presentation of a 
                                                          
 85.  See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 10 (2003); see also AMY 
CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL 
INSTABILITY 9 (“Markets concentrate enormous wealth in the hands of an ‘outsider’ minority, fomenting ethnic 
envy and hatred among often chronically poor majorities.”). For literary perspectives on the long-standing and 
embedded tendency to “other” members of an out-group, see, for example, GLORIA ANZALDÚA, BORDERLANDS 
/ LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA 100-01 (2d ed. 1999). 
 86.  See, e.g., Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Space Between Us: Stereotype Threat and Distance in Interra-
cial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (2008); Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor & Gabriel 
Mugny, “I’m Not Gay. . . . I’m a Real Man!”: Heterosexual Men’s Gender Self-Esteem and Sexual Prejudice, 
35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1233 (2009); Janet K. Swim et al., Avoiding Stigma by Association: 
Subtle Prejudice Against Lesbians in the Form of Social Distancing, 21 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
61 (1999). 
 87.  See, e.g., DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EX-
TERMINATE OTHERS (2012); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE 
TURN EVIL 297-323 (2008). 
 88.  See, e.g., Jeff Schimel et al., Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence that Mortality Salience 
Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 905, 912-16 (1999). 
 89.  Greenberg et al., supra note 64, at 309-13. 
 90.  See, e.g., Holly A. McGregor et al., Terror Management and Aggression: Evidence that Mortality 
Salience Motivates Aggression Against Worldview-Threatening Others, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
590 (1998) (demonstrating that participants allocate a particularly large portion of hot sauce for those who 
threaten their political beliefs); see also Armand Chatard, Loss Shapes Political Views? Terror Management, 
Political Ideology, and Death of Close Others, 32 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2 (2010); Lea Winerman, 
The Politics of Mortality: Some Psychologists Say that Americans’ Fears of Death Could Have Given President 
Bush the Edge in the 2004 Election, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan05/mortality.aspx. 
 91.  See, e.g., Jamie L. Goldenberg et al., Gender-Typical Responses to Sexual and Emotional Infidelity as 
a Function of Mortality Salience Induced Self-Esteem Striving, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1585 
(2003); Schimel et al., supra note 88, at 910-12, 916-18. 
 92.  See, e.g., Schimel et al., supra note 88, at 918-21. 
 93.  See, e.g., supra notes 68-69, 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See, e.g., supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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mortality reminder and the final decision.95 This is concerning because trials are often 
drawn out ordeals with extended periods between the presentation of gruesome visual 
evidence and the call for a verdict. If the goal of the court system is to reach objective 
determinations of guilt based primarily on evidence and factual findings, this height-
ened potential for derogation is highly problematic. 
Concerns about juror impartiality under mortality salience are exacerbated by the 
racial and socio-economic inequalities inherent in the American justice system. Indi-
viduals accused of crimes often fit the mold of “outsiders” because they are racial 
minorities,96 are of lower income status97 and educational attainment,98 are mentally 
disabled,99 or come from generally tumultuous backgrounds.100 Conversely, individ-
uals who tend to serve on juries are likely white101 and of the requisite economic and 
social status to spend considerable time in jury service, a privilege that less affluent 
individuals may not possess.102 These group membership differences between jurors 
and those accused create an optimal environment for derogation by amplifying the 
salience of the outsider. 
Skeptics may argue that the diversity of a jury should neutralize these effects. 
Indeed, twelve randomly selected individuals are likely to belong to different social 
groups and possess different ideologies. As such, the discordance between the group 
membership or ideologies of a single juror and the accused should, theoretically, not 
significantly affect the outcome of the trial. Unfortunately, despite psychological re-
search showing that jury diversity decreases errors in decision-making,103 the system 
                                                          
 95.  Jeff Greenberg et al., Role of Consciousness and Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts in Mortality 
Salience Effects, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 627 (1994); see also Greenberg et al., supra note 
57, at 91-93. 
 96.  See Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008 Annual Rates 
for 2009 and 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Nov. 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. 
 97.  See, e.g., Peter Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal & Nonverbal Behavior in 
Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 139-42 (1985); Melissa S. Kearney & Benjamin H. Harris, The 
Unequal Burden of Crime and Incarceration on America’s Poor, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 28, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/04/28/the-unequal-burden-of-crime-and-incarceration-on-
americas-poor. 
 98.  See, e.g., Karen Heimer, Socioeconomic Status, Subcultural Definitions, and Violent Delinquency, 75 
SOC. FORCES 799 (1997); Violence and Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-violence.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 99.  See, e.g., Michael Kroll, Buckle of Death Belt: The Death Penalty in Microcosm, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/chattahoochee-judicial-district-buckle-death-belt-death-pen-
alty-microcosm (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) 
 100.  See, e.g., Claire A. Ogilvie et al., Attachment & Violent Offending: A Meta-Analysis, 19 AGGRESSION 
AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 322 (2014); Patrick Renn, The Link Between Childhood Trauma and Later Violent Of-
fending: The Application of Attachment Theory in a Probation Setting, 4 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 294 
(2002). 
 101.  See, e.g., Karen R. Humes et al., Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. 4 (Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. 
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has lagged behind in adapting to this new information.104 Furthermore, even gener-
ously setting aside systemic problems with jury diversity in the United States, as well 
as the reality of racialized and stereotype-driven uses of peremptory challenges and 
jury selection techniques,105 this argument is undermined by another source of terror-
induced derogation. Specifically, the accused is extremely disadvantaged not just be-
cause he or she is likely a member of a discernible outgroup, but because he or she is 
now associated with murder—a crime so heinous that it is systemically threatening 
to the worldviews of practically all individuals. 
A helpful framework for understanding this source of prejudice is the System 
Justification Theory.106 This theory “posits a general human tendency to support and 
defend the social status quo,” which causes people to behave defensively when they 
“perceive a threat to the legitimacy of a system to which they are attached.”107 Dec-
ades of social science research have supported this proposition.108 Furthermore, an 
individual may defend a system even when the system conflicts with that individual’s 
ideological motives.109 Because of this bias for the system, “[t]hreats to the social 
order can also increase people’s desire for revenge against the perpetrators of those 
threats . . . in an effort to defend and protect the social order.”110 Social scientists 
have uncovered pertinent manifestations of this behavior that are relevant to the 
courtroom context. For example, in a study by Derek Rucker, participants treated 
hypothetical criminals more punitively when the crime committed was highly threat-
ening to the social system.111 Similarly, Cheryl Kaiser used system justification mo-
tives to elicit strong desires for revenge against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.112 
Murder will no doubt instigate similar vengeful responses from jurors because 
of the immense threat the crime poses to the social order. When criminal defendants 
are accused of murder, they are tagged with an incredibly destabilizing label. Because 
jurors under mortality salience need to cling to their worldviews, and worldviews are 
commonly defined through the groups and concepts that individuals align themselves 
with, the last thing jurors would want would be to associate themselves with someone 
who has been accused of such a terrifying crime. As such, jurors may attempt to 
unconsciously punish and distance themselves from the defendant. In other words, 
the mere premise that a defendant could have committed murder may be enough to 
put that defendant in a distinct group of “others.” 
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In sum, the literature suggests that those accused of murder are prime targets for 
terror-induced derogation because of either tangible, discernible group membership 
or simply because the crime with which they are associated is deeply threatening to 
the social order. This is a tremendous problem if our justice system seeks to decide 
cases on the merits rather than aggravated passions. Before discussing potential so-
lutions, however, it is important to address a few clarifying points. 
C. The Power of Visual Evidence 
An important point to address is why we should focus primarily on visual evi-
dence and not other types of potentially gruesome material such as written or auditory 
evidence. The short answer is simply that, in murder trials, it is practically impossible 
to inoculate the jury from every reminder of death. At some tipping point, broad ex-
clusions will begin to eat away at any avenue the prosecution may have at carrying 
out its role in the justice system. As such, we should strive to restrict only the most 
prejudicial types of gruesome evidence while allowing prosecutors some leeway to 
substitute unduly prejudicial evidence with less extreme alternatives. 
Visual evidence presents the clearest danger of unfair prejudice. As Judge Posner 
put it: 
Physical exhibits . . . are a very powerful form of evidence, in some cases too 
powerful, as we learn in Julius Caesar from Antony’s masterful demagogic use of 
Caesar’s blood-stained toga and slashed body to arouse the Roman mob. After hear-
ing a welter of confusing and contradictory testimony, perhaps of a technical na-
ture . . . or being led through a maze of inscrutable documentation . . . the jury is in-
vited to resolve its doubts on the basis of a simple, tangible, visible, everyday object 
of reassuring familiarity. “Seeing is believing,” as the misleading old saw goes.113 
The psychological literature seems to back up Judge Posner’s intuitions. Indeed, 
in a 2006 study, David Bright and Jane Goodman-Delahunty presented participants 
with either verbal or photographic evidence that was either gruesome or non-grue-
some.114 They found that participants presented with the gruesome photographs ex-
perienced more negative emotions, particularly anger.115 This anger, in turn, moder-
ated a significant increase in conviction rates when compared to participants not 
presented with such photographs.116 Bright and Goodman-Delahunty explained that 
negative emotions increase the amount of blame an individual ascribes to a particular 
offender.117 The individual experiencing the negative emotions may relax his or her 
interpretation of conviction standards, exaggerate negative evidence, or search for 
information in a manner that confirms guilt.118 These reactions are well supported in 
the existing literature.119 
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To the extent that visual cues produce the strongest negative emotions, it is un-
surprising that they lead to an increased willingness to convict based on the negative 
emotions rather than the strength of evidence presented. Indeed, anger has been as-
sociated with increased attribution of blame, even for accidents.120 Additionally, an-
gry people experience impaired cognitive processing and are more likely to rely on 
stereotypes and heuristics to make quick attributions of fault.121 Furthermore, indi-
viduals feeling either disgust or fear may make more defensive attributions of fault 
due to the anxiety that the fate of the victim will befall them as well.122 Returning to 
Terror Management Theory, it is worrying to imagine how much worse the deroga-
tion effects would be with both emotionally-driven impulses and terror management 
processes affecting jurors’ cognitive capacities. 
D. The Focus on Murder Trials 
There is a strong argument that, given the robustness of the psychological litera-
ture, the exclusion of gruesome visual evidence should apply to all cases, including 
civil cases. In this Article, I have not gone this far for a few reasons. First, the use of 
gruesome visual evidence in murder trials is the most pressing problem because the 
defendant’s life and liberty are on the line. Since murder carries the harshest punish-
ments our system deals out, it is vital that we turn our attention to reforming murder 
trials first. Second, it may be practically difficult to instigate an expansive policy 
change in one fell swoop without facing crippling resistance. Progress, at least in the 
law, is generally made incrementally. Third, it is unclear whether non-death-related 
gruesome images in civil trials, such as photographs of severed body parts in tort 
cases, produce similar terror management effects. While it is highly probable from a 
theoretical perspective, future scholarship should seek to extend the current Article 
based on progress in both the legal and empirical literature. 
To conclude, an exceedingly robust psychological literature points to a reality 
we can no longer deny. We simply cannot continue to admit gruesome visual evi-
dence as freely as we do without sacrificing our commitments to fair and impartial 
trials. Cases should be decided on the weight of each side’s evidence rather than the 
extent to which each side is able to arouse negative emotions and employ cognitive 
distractions. The following section argues for two potential solutions. 
IV. TURNING THE TIDES AND SHIFTING THE BURDENS 
As Parts II and III have demonstrated, our current approach to gruesome visual 
evidence, which values admission over exclusion, is deficient. It does not account for 
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the well-documented effects such evidence may have on jurors’ emotional and cog-
nitive states.123 There are two viable options for correcting this problem. Both options 
can be accomplished in two ways—either through the amendment of the jurisdic-
tion’s rules of evidence or a corresponding judicial interpretation of Rule 403 (or a 
state equivalent) that augments the standard for the admissibility of gruesome visual 
evidence in murder trials. 
A. Categorical Exclusions 
An easy fix for the problems caused by gruesome visual evidence is to simply 
exclude such evidence from the courtroom altogether, at least in murder trials. While 
categorical exclusion may seem like a radical proposition,124 it is actually a relatively 
familiar concept in our existing evidentiary frameworks. For example, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence contain such exclusions. Rule 409 prohibits the admission of 
“[e]vidence of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or 
similar expenses resulting from injury.”125 Similarly, Rule 610 prohibits the admis-
sion of “evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions . . . to attack or support 
the witness’ credibility.”126 Moreover, general rules of privilege have almost sacred 
significance in our justice system. In fact, just recently, a federal district court judge 
ruled that the sanctity and certainty of attorney-client privilege takes precedence over 
something as crucial as another defendant’s right to assert an advice of counsel de-
fense.127 
Rule drafters and judges can also soften a categorical exclusion by providing a 
limited number of discrete exceptions. This approach permeates many of the Federal 
Rules of Evidences as well. Indeed, the following are generally prohibited except in 
limited circumstances: propensity or character evidence,128 remedial measures,129 
compromise offers and negotiations,130 plea discussions that do not result in a guilty 
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plea,131 liability insurance,132 and, most famously, hearsay.133 These exclusions are 
commonly made on the basis of public policy decisions. For example, we exclude 
remedial measures because of the “social policy of encouraging people to take, or at 
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”134 We 
also exclude compromise offers and negotiations because of the “public policy fa-
voring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”135 Moreover, we exclude plea 
discussions that do not result in guilty pleas because “[e]ffective criminal law admin-
istration in many localities would hardly be possible if a large proportion of the 
charges were not disposed of by such compromises.”136 As such, “free communica-
tion is needed, and security against having an offer of compromise or related state-
ment admitted in evidence effectively encourages it.”137 If the public policies of 
safety, peace, and even efficient administration necessitate exclusion of evidence, 
then certainly the public policies of justice and due process for criminal defendants 
should as well. Furthermore, it is worth noting that many of the policy rationales laid 
out by the Federal Rules of Evidence are based mostly on the intuitions of individual 
drafters or judges, while the dangers of gruesome visual evidence are empirically 
backed by hundreds of psychological studies. 
A categorical exclusion provides numerous benefits beyond shielding juror im-
partiality. A hard and fast rule promotes efficiency in the trial context that often re-
quires hundreds of evidentiary decisions in a single day. This lightens the cognitive 
load on judges and allows them to conserve their mental resources for the more nu-
anced and complex issues that come up.138 Categorical rules also create standardiza-
tion in case outcomes both within and across jurisdictions because different judges, 
with varying perspectives on the Rule 403 analysis, are all obliged to come out the 
same way on certain issues. This fosters predictability and the increased likelihood 
of equal treatment for all defendants under the law. This need for standardization is 
becoming even more important given emerging evidence that various situational fac-
tors, even those as seemingly innocuous as the number of hours since a judge has 
eaten, can significantly affect how punitively judges rule.139 
One important counterargument to address is whether exclusions rob judges of 
flexibility in what is usually a complex trial setting. First, as already discussed, any 
categorical exclusion can be softened through the use of exceptions. Even if not every 
gruesome visual photograph will create undue prejudice that outweighs its probative 
value, evidentiary codes can account for this minority of cases while still maintaining 
a default exclusionary rule. For example, we could carve out a specific exception for 
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photographs where the defendant on trial happens to also be in the photograph with 
the victim’s corpse, establishing a very strong link between that specific defendant 
and the murder. Second, as already discussed, just because we give judges the poten-
tial for flexibility does not mean they will necessarily be able to use it, due to the 
limits of human cognitive capacities.140 Freeing up judges’ mental resources on “eas-
ier” issues backed extensively by psychological literature can actually improve how 
judges tackle more nuanced and complex issues, enhancing the trial process on bal-
ance. Third, a little less flexibility is sometimes normatively desirable when appro-
priate. If enough empirical studies support a need for a relatively more rigid rule, it 
may be wise to seriously consider that position. 
B. A Presumption of Prejudice 
A second solution to the issues posed by gruesome visual evidence is to flip the 
presumption of the Rule 403 analysis in the context of murder trials. In other words, 
instead of requiring unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh the evidence’s proba-
tive value, we could require that the probative value substantially outweigh the unfair 
prejudice instead. Variants of this approach seem to have been successfully adopted 
into some jurisdictions’ evidentiary jurisprudence.141 The clearest example is the 
state of Utah, which has developed extensive case law on the issue. It is instructive 
to review this history in order to tease out the legal and policy rationales that have 
entrenched themselves in Utah evidentiary practice. 
The Supreme Court of Utah first verbalized its legal standard for gruesome visual 
evidence in State v. Garcia.142 In Garcia, a jury convicted the criminal defendants of 
second-degree murder after seeing five color photographs of the victim’s bloody 
corpse and the surrounding crime scene.143 In reviewing the lower court’s decision 
to admit the photographs, the court explained that it was crucial to determine whether 
the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighed “the photographs’ essential 
evidentiary value.”144 The court further explained that “essential evidentiary value in 
the context of potentially prejudicial photographs of the victim’s body” would “gen-
erally be inappropriate where the only relevant evidence they convey can be put be-
fore the jury readily and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential 
prejudice.”145 
Just three years later, the court faced a similar issue in State v. Cloud.146 In Cloud, 
a jury convicted a criminal defendant for the murder of his fiancée after seeing pho-
tographs of the victim’s bloody corpse and close-ups of the stab wounds.147 In deter-
mining whether the district court erred in admitting such evidence, the Utah Supreme 
Court looked to past case law to determine whether the district court could have sub-
stituted the gruesome visual evidence for a less prejudicial type of evidence. 
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The court first discussed the 1968 case State v. Poe, where at issue were the 
“admitted autopsy photographs of a homicide victim’s dissected brain cavity[,] to 
illustrate the path of the fatal bullets.”148 There, the court found reversible error in 
the decision to admit the photographs because all the relevant information that could 
have been gleaned from the photographs had already been introduced by the lay and 
medical testimony.149 Similarly, the court recounted the 1979 case State v. Wells 
where the court reasoned that photographs of a homicide victim were “superfluous” 
because the uncontested testimony of the medical examiner had already established 
the facts that the photographs were allegedly introduced to establish.150 As such, the 
photographs had “no evidentiary value except the hoped-for emotional impact on the 
jury.”151 
Following the reasoning in Poe and Wells and the general standard laid out in 
Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court found error in the admission of the autopsy photo-
graphs. While the State argued that the photographs illustrated “the brutality of the 
attack,” the court noted that there were multiple viable alternatives to the photograph 
including the examiner’s testimony, the police officers’ testimony, and a visual chart, 
all of which discussed the location and position of the body as well as the extent of 
the wounds.152 The Utah Supreme Court then concluded that there was no probative 
value to the photographs and reversed the conviction.153 
Two years later, in State v. Lafferty, the Utah Supreme Court took the strongest 
stance it had taken on the issue when it considered the admissibility of two gruesome 
photographs of the corpses of a woman and a child.154 The Utah Supreme Court 
stated, in relevant part: 
Although the rule’s language seems to require a simple balancing of probative 
value and potential for unfair prejudice, our past decisions have recognized that in-
herent in certain categories of relevant evidence is an unusually strong propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these categories is uniquely 
subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and improperly skew the out-
come. Consequently, when evidence falling within such a category is offered, we 
have required a showing of unusual probative value before it is admissible under rule 
403. In the absence of such a showing, the probative value of such evidence is pre-
sumed to be “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”155 
The court went a step further, however, in categorizing gruesome photographic 
evidence as inherently prejudicial material: 
[G]ruesome photographs will often be excluded because the required showing of 
unusual probativeness cannot be made. This is because there is no legitimate need for 
the gruesome photographs of a homicide victim’s corpse that prosecutors usually 
seek to introduce. An important consideration in assessing the probative value of a 
photograph is whether the facts shown by the photograph can be established by other 
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means.156 
The Utah Supreme Court then ruled that the lower court had erred by admitting 
the photographs.157 Indeed, the nature of the wounds and the positioning of the body, 
the reasons given by the prosecution for the photographs’ relevance, had already been 
established by the testimony of the victims, police officers, and medical examiner.158 
The photographs were “merely cumulative” of such testimony.159 
Following State v. Lafferty, Utah courts eventually cemented the case’s reason-
ing by applying the “presumption of prejudice” standard to succeeding cases involv-
ing gruesome visual evidence.160 The current standard, summarized at length in State 
v. Bluff, is helpful in conceptualizing how a presumption of prejudice would be “cod-
ified” in practice: 
If, however, the photograph meets the legal definition of gruesomeness, it may 
not be admitted absent a showing of “unusual probative value.” The burden is thereby 
shifted at this stage of the analysis to the State to show that the probative value of 
such evidence substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. It is true that shift-
ing the burden to the State runs contrary to the general presumption of admissibility 
favored by the Rules of Evidence. However, we have determined that this departure 
from the general rule is both necessary and equitable. The decision to admit a crime 
scene or autopsy photograph generally must be made early in the proceedings, before 
its probative value can be easily ascertained. Given that this evidence, by definition, 
has a tendency to confuse and inflame the jury, we believe it is appropriate for courts 
to err on the side of caution and exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence unless the State 
can show good cause for its admission.161 
The logic used by the Utah Supreme Court is incredibly helpful in countering the 
prevailing assumption that exclusion of a gruesome photograph affects the complete-
ness of the evidence presented to the jury.162 Instead, courts can and should scrutinize 
gruesome evidence more closely as parties can frequently make the same point in 
ways that are far less prejudicial and threatening to the fairness of the trial. Many of 
the facts that lawyers seek to establish through gruesome visual evidence, such as 
body positioning or wound severity, can be established through verbal testimony 
from victims, witnesses, police officers, and experts. Lawyers can also use diagrams 
and auditory aides that support their narratives but stop short of attempting to play 
on the emotions of the jury. Furthermore, with the rise of new technology, lawyers 
can even digitally reconstruct replicas of crime scene images without contaminating 
the jury with brutal, bloody images.163 
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Utah’s evidentiary jurisprudence should not be interpreted as a deviation from 
acceptable evidentiary practice. In fact, Utah’s specificity and clarity in describing 
the reversed presumption aligns with the general standard endorsed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Indeed, the Court has interpreted the very use of the word 
“probative” in Rule 403 to denote a concept similar to Utah’s “essential evidentiary 
value.” Specifically, according to the Court, evidence should not be analyzed as “an 
island, with estimates of its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole 
reference points in deciding whether the danger substantially outweighs the value and 
whether the evidence ought to be excluded.”164 This “would leave the party offering 
evidence with the option to structure a trial in whatever way would produce the max-
imum unfair prejudice consistent with relevance.”165 Instead, “a reading of the com-
panions to Rule 403, and of the commentaries that went with them to Congress, 
makes it clear that what counts as the Rule 403 probative value of an item of evidence, 
as distinct from its Rule 401 relevance, may be calculated by comparing evidentiary 
alternatives.”166 This means “that a judge applying Rule 403 could reasonably apply 
some discount to the probative value of an item of evidence when faced with less 
risky alternative proof going to the same point.”167 
What seems like an apparent counterargument is that a judicially initiated rever-
sal of the Rule 403 standard directly contravenes the plain language of Rule 403. This 
concern is misguided. As already discussed, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain 
numerous general exclusions.168 These exclusions all follow the underlying principle 
behind the Rule 403 analysis in that the drafters simply anticipated that specific types 
of evidence’s prejudicial effect would almost always outweigh their probative value. 
A reversal of the standard in the narrow situation wherein gruesome visual evidence 
is introduced in murder trials is no different from any of these general exclusions. 
Judges are just deciding that, in a majority of cases, these images’ cannot make the 
requisite showing of probative value to warrant admission, in light of the undue prej-
udice the images could introduce. 
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that, compared to a cate-
gorical exclusion, a reversal of the standard could be more open to abuse. Specifi-
cally, judges could use their remaining discretion to continue to accept rationales 
such as identifying the location of wounds or showing body positioning as “substan-
tially outweighing” gruesome visual evidence’s unfair prejudicial effect. To prevent 
this, judges would need to create a strong body of case law that clearly catalogues the 
exceptional circumstances in which gruesome visual evidence should be admitted in 
the murder trial setting. Judges would also have to stay mindful of decoy rationales 
that do not comport with the Supreme Court’s mandate of carefully considering evi-
dentiary alternatives. That being said, however, we cannot underestimate the power 
of a statutory or judicial amendment to an existing legal standard. An amendment 
will very likely produce some sort of behavioral shift in judicial decisions or at least 
                                                          
Crime Scene Reconstruction, NAT’L CENTER FOR AUDIO & VIDEO FORENSICS, http://www.ncavf.com/arti-
cles/Crime-Scene-Reconstruction-articles.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 164.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182 (1997). 
 165.  Id. at 183. 
 166.  Id. at 184 (emphasis added). 
 167.  Id. at 183. 
 168.  See supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text. 
  25 
put decision-makers on notice of the dangers of gruesome visual evidence.169 This 
development will certainly be an improvement on the status quo and will only grow 
in influence as it is slowly accepted and adopted. 
V. ADDRESSING RESISTANCE AND REJECTING THE STATUS QUO 
Throughout this Article, I have responded to a number of potential counterargu-
ments. In Part I, I clarified that the purpose of this paper is not to attack the value of 
narrative integrity wholesale, or to recommend that the entire system lean on the side 
of exclusion. Instead, this Article is focused on a narrow but crucial subset of deci-
sions involving gruesome visual evidence in murder trials. In Part II, I responded to 
many of the Supreme Court’s stated rationales for the importance of narrative integ-
rity and explained why they do not carry the day, at least in murder trials. In Part III, 
I explained that the emphasis on visual evidence, instead of oral or auditory evidence, 
is far from arbitrary. In fact, it contributes to a balanced system that gives prosecutors 
a menu of different options that pose less of an unfair threat to defendants. Finally, 
in Part IV, I explained why neither a categorical exclusion nor a presumption of prej-
udice approach is alien to our current system of evidence, contravenes the text of 
Rule 403, or threatens judicial flexibility. In this final section, I hope to anticipate 
and put to rest additional counterarguments that have not yet been explicitly ad-
dressed in the Article. In addressing these counterarguments, I expose the status quo 
as simply untenable. 
A. Cognitive Pitfalls of Jurors 
When psychological research challenges our conception of the human capacity 
for neutral judgment, it tends to be uncomfortable. Indeed, we all like to think that 
we are mentally strong, capable, and intelligent individuals who can be fully trusted, 
under any circumstances, with important decisions. One problem with this view of 
human capabilities, however, is that it does not take the unconscious nature of terror 
management into account. Unconscious biases “influence our behavior . . . but we 
remain oblivious to their influence.”170 As such, they are notoriously difficult to iden-
tify, much less address. 
Terror management is far from a maladaptive human quirk. Multiple social sci-
entists have theorized that terror management processes are particularly entrenched 
because they serve important evolutionary functions.171 The human “combination of 
an instinctive drive for self-preservation with a [unique] awareness of the inevitabil-
ity of death creates the potential for paralyzing terror.”172 Over the years, societies 
constructed cultural systems and worldviews to mitigate such threats of death.173 
These worldviews provide “meaning, order, permanence, stability, and the promise 
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of literal []or symbolic immortality to those who live up to the standards of value set 
by the worldview.”174 Human beings unconsciously and automatically cling to these 
worldviews to preserve their self-esteem and buffer anxiety in the face of overwhelm-
ing threats.175 
Furthermore, the specific worldviews that people subscribe to, relating to certain 
ideologies and membership in social groups, can unconsciously cause prejudicial be-
havior from even the well intentioned. Anthony Greenwald produced the most fa-
mous demonstration of this unconscious derogation in their work on the Implicit As-
sociation Test.176 They found that participants who would have explicitly denied that 
they were prejudiced towards African Americans demonstrated implicit negative re-
sponses towards them nevertheless.177 Commentators have attributed this automatic-
ity to the fact that “connections made often enough in the conscious mind eventually 
become unconscious.”178 Unsurprisingly, the cultural atmosphere plays a vital role 
in the entrenchment of these implicit biases. For example, “[b]y five years of age . . . 
many children have definite and entrenched stereotypes about blacks, women, and 
other social groups.”179 These stereotypes are then further reinforced by “peer pres-
sure, mass media, [and] the actual balance of power in society.”180 Attempting to 
overcome these entrenched biases within the truncated framework of a single trial is 
too difficult a task for any individual juror. 
Also worth noting is the difficulty of discerning whether undesirable uncon-
scious processes are ever properly thwarted prior to a juror’s verdict, despite what 
the juror may claim or believe. People are simply bad at monitoring such unconscious 
processes precisely because they occur “without awareness or intention.”181 Addi-
tionally, people are incredibly motivated to eschew suggestions that they may be 
prejudiced. Indeed, in a meta-analysis of over a hundred studies on implicit biases, 
Anthony Greenwald found “that impression management can undermine validity of 
self-report measures in socially sensitive domains” such as discussions of race.182 As 
such, it is unrealistic to suggest that jurors “fix” their automatic reactions after 
they’ve been exposed to gruesome visual evidence. They may not know what to fix 
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or how to fix it, and they may be more focused on denying that they could have 
unconscious prejudice at all. 
B. Cognitive Pitfalls of Judges 
If we can’t trust the average human capacity for self-reflection, we may believe 
that judges, with their lengthy careers and wealth of legal experiences, are better 
equipped to make decisions in the course of a trial than the layman. As such, one may 
argue that these experts can be fully trusted to make the correct exclusionary deci-
sions, regardless of the language of the relevant evidentiary rule. Unfortunately, that 
may not be the case. As an initial matter, in most states, judges are elected rather than 
appointed based on their credentials and illustrious careers.183 More importantly, 
however, studies seem to support the idea that no one is immune from the limitations 
of human cognitions, not even judges. 
Judges are just as likely to be influenced by unconscious racial biases,184 arbi-
trary situational factors,185 and judgment errors caused by taking cognitive shortcuts 
rather than engaging in comprehensive, deliberative processing.186 Most importantly, 
however, terror induced derogation has been clearly demonstrated in judicial deci-
sion-making.187 It is an unfortunate truth that even those we entrust with key deci-
sions in our justice system, who may have only good intentions, still fall prey to the 
unconscious impact of gruesome visual evidence without even being fully aware of 
it. 
C. The Futility of Screening Jurors 
Some may argue that even if we all suffer, to some extent, from unconscious 
biases, there are surely individuals who are simply better at staving off these im-
pulses.  If that were true, then the way to target the effects of gruesome visual evi-
dence would be to simply select, through the voir dire process and the use of peremp-
tory challenges, the jurors least likely to fall prey to cognitive pitfalls.188 There is a 
wealth of research investigating both potential “risk factors” for terror management 
susceptibility as well as potential “buffers” against such susceptibility. 
Social scientists have found that individuals with higher self-esteem are less vul-
nerable to the unconscious processes triggered by gruesome visual evidence because 
self-esteem acts as a buffer against existential anxiety.189 A similar effect has been 
found for trait-based self-control.190 Conversely, individuals who are high in author-
itarianism—”a pattern of traits or generalized behavioral style characterized by high 
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regard for authority, rigidity, conventionality, and contempt or disdain for those who 
are worse off”—are more likely to derogate those who threaten their worldviews 
when under mortality salience.191 In theory, retaining as many individuals with high 
self-esteem and self-control and excluding those high in authoritarianism could help 
neutralize the effects of terror management. In practice, however, this is infeasible. 
The practice of strategically selecting and excluding jurors, commonly called 
scientific jury selection, has gained a great deal of attention in recent years. Unfortu-
nately, results of empirical evaluations of its effectiveness have not been especially 
promising. Joel Lieberman argues that “methodological flaws associated with exist-
ing research prevent clear conclusions from being drawn.”192 Specifically, he outlines 
the lack of meaningful definitions of successful outcomes as well as the concentration 
of scientific jury selection in cases with wealthy litigants who are able to pay to 
strengthen other parts of their litigation strategies as well.193 Furthermore, determin-
ing intangible characteristics such as self-esteem or authoritarianism requires stand-
ardized psychological testing with measures that are both reliable and valid. This type 
of testing, however, has not caught on in the courtroom setting because of the costs 
associated with it.194 Moreover, such testing is unlikely to catch on simply because 
busy dockets and strained judicial resources will not permit extensive psychological 
profiling of each and every juror.195 
Even if comprehensive evaluations of jurors were practically feasible, it is un-
likely that lawyers would use them properly. Lawyers’ preconceived notions of ju-
rors, as well as the hypotheses they are interested in confirming, often bias their sub-
sequent decisions in the jury selection stage.196 More troubling, however, is that 
lawyers are frequently overconfident in their predictions regardless of the amount of 
experience they have in their field.197 As such, given their already entrenched prac-
tices and beliefs, it would be difficult to get lawyers to take a step back and critically 
examine the strategies they utilize when deciding the make-up of a jury,. 
We also need to be cognizant of the deeply troubling problems of racialized jury 
selection. Indeed, in a worrying recent case, Foster v. Chatman, the Georgia Supreme 
Court did not find a violation in the prosecutor’s jury selection strategies even though 
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evidence surfaced that the prosecutor had marked all the black jurors in green high-
lighter, ranked them, and clearly evinced an intent to have them all removed, leaving 
an all-white jury to try a black man accused of murder.198 The fact that this is still a 
glaring problem in our society makes it unrealistic to claim that we can magically 
progress to selecting juries in a manner that takes nuanced psychological character-
istics into account. 
D. Unavailing Post-Hoc Measures 
Another suggested method for overcoming the prejudicial impact of terror man-
agement is simply to confront mortality reminders head-on. This could be accom-
plished by educating jurors about gruesome visual evidence after they have been ex-
posed to such evidence during the course of the trial.199 For example, lawyers could 
present empirical evidence regarding the effects of unconscious processes on deci-
sion-making or ask for appropriate judicial admonishments during the jury instruc-
tion stage of the trial. 
As an initial matter, any experienced trial lawyer will tell you that there is some-
thing misguided about this approach. Indeed, at Yale Law School, visiting practition-
ers and professors advise students, year after year, to think about the ramifications of 
their in-court objections to certain types of evidence.200 Sometimes, objecting to prej-
udicial types of evidence actually brings them to the forefront of jurors’ minds due 
to the increased amount of time spent discussing the evidence and the back and forth 
that inevitably follows between the lawyers and the judge. Conversely, “[e]ven 
though they know that the judge will order it stricken from the record and will instruct 
the jury to disregard it, trial lawyers often introduce objectionable evidence they be-
lieve favorable to their client in the hope that jurors will nonetheless be influ-
enced.”201 These common practices reveal an implicit understanding by litigators that 
judicial instructions and clarifications may not serve as a complete panacea for the 
influence of improper evidence. 
Furthermore, it is patently incorrect to think of humans as machines that can 
simply erase the effects of specific evidence upon instruction by a lawyer or judge. 
Unfortunately, “[p]eople’s inability to disregard relevant but inadmissible evidence 
has been shown in dozens of psychological experiments.”202 Similarly, studies have 
shown that jurors do not set aside their erroneous understandings of the law even after 
careful legal instructions from a judge.203 Indeed, “even relatively simple instructions 
failed to revise subjects’ existing concepts enough to improve the accuracy of their 
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decision making.”204 
Targeting terror management directly faces its greatest obstacle in a phenomenon 
known as the Reactance Theory.205 The theory posits “that when free behaviors are 
threatened, the attractiveness of the threatened behavior increases.”206 For example, 
in one of the first studies of reactance, Jack Brehm and John Sensenig asked partici-
pants to choose between two pictures of different people and then report their im-
pressions.207 To induce reactance, some participants were told that a third party 
thought the participants should choose one specific picture over the other.208 The rest 
of the participants were merely informed of the third party’s personal preference.209 
Participants who were merely informed of the third party’s preference were more 
persuaded to deliver positive impressions of the preferred picture, presumably be-
cause the more overt attempt to sway the participants’ judgments threatened partici-
pants’ free behavior, thus increasing the attractiveness of the forbidden option.210 
One can easily see how this phenomenon could spill into efforts to curb terror man-
agement in legal decision-makers. Warning decision-makers to avoid thoughts of 
death could have the inverse effect of making death thoughts more attractive. 
Even if decision-makers do not make the explicit choice to disobey the lawyer or 
judge, attempts at inoculation may still have the more implicit effect of making death 
thoughts more salient and accessible in jurors’ minds. This phenomenon, described 
extensively in literature on the Ironic Process Theory,211 is most famously exhibited 
by the “white bear” study. Specifically, in the seminal study of Daniel Wegner and 
David Schneider, participants told not to think of a white bear increasingly reported 
such thoughts occurring during the course of the experiment.212 Later studies demon-
strated that this phenomenon could also affect cognitive performance. For example, 
Christian Hart found that individuals who were trying very hard to remember pieces 
of information recalled less of the information than those who were not trying as 
hard.213 It is easy to see how this could similarly apply to jurors trying very hard to 
suppress thoughts about death. Such jurors could ironically become less effective at 
suppression due to the subliminal impact of inoculation efforts. 
Finally, there is always a danger that, upon instruction, jurors may “overcorrect” 
by excluding even valid influences on their legal decisions.214 Indeed, we do not think 
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in discrete, mechanistic units. Instead, our thoughts and experiences are highly inter-
connected, and so the instruction to exclude one very specific piece could spill over 
into pieces that can and should be taken into account in making findings of fact. 
In sum, studies demonstrate that directly attempting to curb the effects of grue-
some visual evidence carries its own sets of risks. Doing so may make jurors even 
more susceptible to unconscious pitfalls than they were originally, either by creating 
an attractive forbidden option or by making death thoughts more accessible in jurors’ 
minds. 
E. The Value of Changing Rules and Standards 
Critics may wonder what the point of a new standard is if it leaves open any 
avenue for discretion, and thus abuse. Indeed, some judges may be able to strategi-
cally use even an altered legal standard to maintain the status quo through skillful 
argumentation and interpretation. The response to this concern is that while rules are 
certainly not a panacea, they still have incredible power, both practically and sym-
bolically. Practically, a clear change in rules, accompanied by documents explaining 
the reasoning for such rules, will significantly alter judges’ behavior. This is espe-
cially true for lower court judges who are often worried about being overturned.215 
Symbolically, a change in rules symbolizes the values and aspirations of society.216 
It represents a shift in the way people think about the principles underlying our sys-
tem and the integrity of our procedures. In many ways, the stated values we espouse 
through our rules shape society’s trajectory, and we have the obligation to make sure 
that the rules point to a more just, fair, and impartial system, rather than simply giving 
up on the exercise of prudent rule-making altogether. 
F. Preserving the Prosecutor’s Role and the Adversarial System 
Some may argue that gruesome visual evidence is one of the most important tools 
for prosecutors in establishing guilt for the crime of murder, especially because they 
have the higher burden of persuasion. I acknowledge that reality and I do not discount 
the importance of the prosecutor’s ability to introduce crucial evidence. However, as 
I’ve discussed extensively in Parts II and IV, we need to critically analyze the argu-
ment that gruesome visual evidence is, in fact, “crucial,” rather than a distraction 
from the merits of a case. Additionally, instead of framing this proposal as one that 
is anti-prosecutor, we should see this as an improvement that is pro-systemic legiti-
macy. Yale Law School Professor Tom Tyler explains that this faith in the system is 
what motivates people to obey the law.217 
This Article seeks to reconcile the prosecutor’s important role as an advocate for 
the government with the prosecutor’s equally important role as an ethical practitioner, 
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a defender of justice, and a prudent decision-maker. We see many instances of pros-
ecutorial misconduct as an outgrowth of the American “win at all costs” culture.218 
Restricting the extent to which prosecutors can use a tool that naturally lends itself to 
interference with a jury’s impartiality, while also leaving open many evidentiary al-
ternatives that foreground facts rather than passions,219 dissuades unethical practice 
and allows ethical prosecutors to find new and creative ways to construct narratives 
purely on the merits of a case. 
Prosecutors should also be incredibly concerned about wrongful convictions. In-
deed, the metric of success should not be confined to the number of convictions an 
office can get, but also the extent to which the office avoids costly errors that can rob 
innocent defendants of their life and liberty. Even going beyond the moral argument, 
wrongful convictions cause an enormous amount of negative press and a decrease in 
the entire system’s perceived legitimacy. In this manner, a more restrictive exclu-
sionary rule for gruesome visual evidence may actually protect offices from backlash. 
It could also shield individual prosecutors from internal and external pressures to 
make use of strategies that could cause irreparable damage to a jury’s impartiality. 
Finally, to the extent that we value the adversarial system, the proposals in this 
Article only strengthen such a system by ensuring that both parties in murder trials 
can employ their strongest arguments in ways that foreground facts and the merits of 
a case instead of emotional and cognitive manipulation. This Article encourages com-
prehensive, thoughtful jury deliberations rather than a reliance on cognitive shortcuts 
and problematic inter-group “othering.” Furthermore, this Article only seeks to in-
crease the legitimacy and integrity of our unique brand of American justice by sub-
jecting it to critical review in light of empirically supported proposals for change. 
CONCLUSION 
Our American justice system is not perfect. Legal decision-makers are not per-
fect. Human beings are not perfect. What I hoped to illuminate through this Article 
is that, despite our shortcomings, our growing repertoire of shared knowledge gives 
us all hope. We now have the incredible power to reform our systems in ways that 
can reliably emphasize prudence, fairness, and equality. As such, we have the corre-
sponding obligation to reflect on the type of justice we produce and strive to further 
our society’s greater values and ideals through our laws and policies. It is my hope 
that, over time, we can restructure our systems so that they do not take advantage of 
human weakness but, instead, capitalize on the marvelous potential of human 
strength.220 
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